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Abstract: The problem regarding the quality of the subjects in international law relations occupies a 
central place in the researchers’ concerns, as the determination of the entities with international legal 
status with the aptitude of holding rights and obligations within the international judicial order is 
absolutely necessary. If traditionally it is considered that the main subjects of international law are the 
states, and the international intergovernmental organizations are derived subjects in public 
international law, the recent doctrine developments record controversial opinions regarding the 
quality of international law subject of the individual. This paper aims at analyzing the contemporary 
doctrine and practice as well as determining the characteristics of the international status of the 
individual. 
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1. Introduction  
This paper analysis a subject that generated numerous controversies in the 
academic environment but not only in this environment and towards which a 
unanimous point of view hasn’t been reached so far: the private person and its 
quality of subject of international law. Performing a short analysis of the evolution 
of this concept from an historical perspective we have underlined the passing from 
the concept according to which only the states can have the quality of subject of 
international law (the individual having in essence the quality of subject of internal 
law) to the opinions of certain authors that include the individual – private person- 
among the subjects of international law. More than that, we have brought to 
attention also the point of view of other authors that place the individual at the 




Although combated, these latter opinions raise questions such as: If the 
intergovernmental international organizations or the national liberation movements 
are exceptions in the international capacity, why the individual- subject of law 
couldn’t benefit from the same statute? 
In the positive law, the term person is susceptible to two relational meanings: on 
one side, the human individuality and on the other side, the collectivity. “In the 
judicial thinking the person represents the quality of the individual or collective 
human to be subject of law with various names in the branches of positive law: 
private person- judicial person (in civil law), employee (in labor law), citizen (in 
constitutional law), public servant (in administrative law), offender (criminal law) 
etc” (Mihai & Mihai, 2005). 
In the context of intensification of the relations between the states, an aspect that 
generated numerous controversies is the relation between the person- subject of 
internal law and person- subject of international law.  Within the international 
society, many categories of entities are manifested, acting as actors of international 
relations: states, governmental and non governmental international organizations, 
nations or people fighting for recovering independence, transnational societies and 
private persons. In the international judicial order, the designation of the quality of 
subject of law is justifies by the need to identify among these only those entities 
with the capacity to acquire international rights and obligations to participate at 
drafting the norms of international law, to participate at the reports governed by the 
judicial norm of international law.  
The concepts regarding the quality of subject of international law relations have 
evolved in time and if at the beginning of the 19th century it was considered that the 
states are the only subjects of international law (Blüntschli, 1881, p. 64), the 20th 
century registers the theories of some authors like Georges Scelle and Leon Duguit, 
who asserted that only the individuals can be subjects of law, that the state as a 
person is a product of fiction, the only reality being the private person taken 
individually and the inter individual relations based on the so called “social 
solidarity” so that the international relations become relations between the 
individuals and groups of individuals, that the state is not a judicial person nor 
sovereign person but the historical product of a social differentiation between the 
classes, those who govern and those governed, thus the individuals, another distinct 
person does not exist but only a federalism of the classes (Dumitrescu, 2008, p. 
72). This theory was rejected by H. Triepel, D. Anzilotti, W.G.F. Philimore and 
other positivist doctrinaires. Beginning with the post war period, the plurality of the 
subjects of international law theory is admitted (Moca & Duu, 2008, p. 128). The 
issues of the quality of subject of international law of the states and 
intergovernmental organizations was solved, the first being qualified at the moment 
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as being main subjects and the second category as being “derived subjects” of 
international law.  
The term state was formulated in very precise terms in the Montevideo Convention 
in 1933, concluded between the United States of America and the Latin American 
states, on the rights and obligations of the states, which provisions in article 1 that 
“the states is a subject of international law with the following characteristics: a) a 
population, b) a territory, c) a government, d) the capacity to develop relations 
with other states”. In the same context is placed the notification no.1 of the 
Arbitration Commission of the Peace Conference for the former Yugoslavia on 
November 29th, 1991, in which the state is defined as being “a collectivity 
comprising a territory, a population subordinated to an organized political 
power”. The international judicial personality of the state reflects its double 
quality, of creator and recipient of the international judicial norms. The doctrine 
established without equivoque that only the states have the capacity to acquire and 
assume the totality of the international rights and obligations in their quality of 
“original, typical and fundamental subjects of international law” (Anghel, 2002, p. 
53). 
The international organization is a judicial creation, defined by the International 
Law Commission of the UN as “an association of states constituted by treaty, 
provided with a constitution and common organs and possessing a distinct judicial 
personality from the member states’”. The Vienna Convention in 1969 on the right 
of the treaties restrains this definition, expressly mentioning in article 2, i) that the 
collocation “international organization” defines an intergovernmental organization, 
clearly delimitating these entities from the non governmental organizations that are 
considered in general as being subjects of internal law, even if some authors state 
that some would benefit from a partially international statute or would have a 
certain degree of normative power (Carreau, 1994, pp. 29-30). If until 1945 there 
was still a contradiction in opinions regarding them as well in what concerns their 
judicial personality of international law, at present the fact that the international 
organizations have a “certain” international position is accepted, of course different 
from the one of the states. The content of the judicial capacity of the international 
organizations has to be expressly provisioned in the constitutive act and is limited 
and different from one organization to another.  
It has been established also that in certain conditions the national liberation 
movements are considered subjects of public international law with limited and 
transitory capacity. An ambiguous situation is still maintained in what concerns the 
quality of subject of international law of the subject which remains an object of 
controversy between the doctrinaires. Next we will make an analysis of the 
international regulations, of the doctrine positions expressed in the judicial 
literature and the international jurisprudence in order to argue the necessity of 




category among the subjects of international law, recipient of international rights 
and obligations.  
 
2. Protection of the Individual through Norms on International Law 
and International Mechanisms through which the Individual can Claim 
the Protection of his Rights 
In approaching this subject the fact that there are authors that recognize 
unconditionally this quality of the private person must be taken into consideration 
but on the other side there are many authors that contest its placement among the 
subjects of international law.  
The first opinion is based on arguments such as the adoption by the states of a 
series of international documents that offer protection regarding the international 
rights and liberties, the establishment and development of mechanisms the 
individual can use directly at international judicial instances for the protection of 
his rights, the recognition of the individual as subject of international criminal 
liability.  
The antagonists of this theory motivate their option on the mediated position of the 
private persons within the frame of the international law relations. If in the internal 
judicial law the quality of subject of law is inherent to the private person, it can 
appear in the international relations only if the states manifest their express desire 
in this direction; the individual will not be the titular of the rights listed in an 
international treaty unless the states give their approval in certain prerogatives in 
the international relations. The literature mentioned that even the private persons 
(same as the non governmental organizations) are “subjects whose presence is 
tolerated by states in the international order” (Blachèr, 2008, p. 80). 
Ian Brownlie claims that in strict analytical terms it cannot be asserted that the 
individual is subject of international law but at the same time, there is no general 
rule according to which the individual cannot be subject of international law 
(Brownlie, 2003, p. 65).  
Ideas regarding the rights intrinsic to the human nature according to which all 
humans are equal in dignity and any human being has eternal and immutable as 
well as obligations have appeared even in ancient times as the institution of the 
human rights knew a long process of crystallization and appearing in the present as 
a very complex institution in relation with the internal judicial order as well as with 
the international one. (Duculescu, 1994, pp. 18-19). 
The historical evolution of the human rights institution was marked by documents 
such as Magna Charta Libertatum (1215), the Bill of Rights (England, 1689), the 
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Declaration of Independence of the United States of America (July 4, 1776), the 
Declaration of human and citizens’ rights in 1789.  
The creation of the League of Nations has lead to an “institutionalization at 
international level” of the protection of human rights and was the first step towards 
their universalization but unfortunately this issue hasn’t been followed with 
consistency except for some aspects (Moroianu Zlătescu, 2007, p. 16). Prior, 
through the Geneva Conventions (1864, 1906) and Hague Conventions (1899 and 
1907) regulations were adopted, with the purpose of ensuring the protection of 
certain categories of people: injured, ill, prisoners, civil population etc. 
All these considered, only after the Second World War we can say that the human 
rights have known an accentuated development, the problematic of human rights 
went beyond the borders of the national state and the state cooperation in this 
context has been concretized in adopting some fundamental texts.  
The United Nations Chart, adopted in 1945, following the Conference in San 
Francisco proclaims in its preamble “to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, 
in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and 
women and of nations large and small” and has the great merit to have been 
introduced the human rights in the international order (Selejan-Guan & 
Crăciunean, 2008, p. 101). Article 1, paragraph 3 of the United Nations Chart 
declares the following fundamental purposes of the UN: achieve international co-
operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or 
humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights 
and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, 
or religion. To accomplish these purposes the UN member states commit to 
promote the universal and effective respect of the human rights and fundamental 
liberties for all, irrespective of the race, sex, language or religion and cooperate 
with the organization to promote the fundamental human rights and liberties. 
But among these texts the Universal Declaration of Human Rights detaches being a 
document of emblematic value although it does not have judicial value (being a 
recommendation of the UN and not a treaty). In its content a list of civil, political, 
economic and social rights is mentioned, recognized to any person but not as a 
citizen of a state but as a human being: “All human beings are born free and equal 
in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act 
towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood” (article 1), “Everyone has the right 
to life, liberty and security of person” (article 3). We can affirm that the adoption 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights marked the passing from “citizens’ 
rights” to “human rights” (Moroianu Zlătescu, 2007, p. 25), the beginning of an 
assembly of international, regional and national instruments regarding the 
fundamental human rights and liberties, of a system of principles mandatory for the 




In 1966, the General Assembly of the UN adopted two acts on the human rights: 
the International Covenant of economic, social, cultural human rights and the 
International Covenant n the civil and political rights that have transformed the 
provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in judicial obligations for 
the signatory states. We can strongly affirm that the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights has constituted actually the source of inspiration of all the 
instruments in this matter that form today the assembly of judicial norms on 
protecting the human rights.  
The international legislation on human rights has developed subsequently to the 
adoption of this document with numerous regulations comprised in the 
conventions, covenants and treaties adopted under the aegis of international or 
regional organizations: United Nations, Council of Europe, European Union etc. In 
their content the individual is considered as being the recipient f norms of 
international law, is protected either as individual human being or as member of a 
group of people.  
The doctrine has refused the quality of subject of international law to the private 
person, motivating that the individual is not the direct recipient of the norm of 
international law but benefits from the protection of the norm of international law 
but only through the state and only if that state assumed all the commitments by 
international treaties regarding the international statute of the private person 
(Scăuna, 2007, p. 124). 
In the matter of human rights thus, the international jurisdictions have stated the 
superiority of the international norms in relation to those of internal law, the more 
favorable norm of international law being able to exclude the norm of internal law, 
even if it has constitutional character. The constitution of Romania provisions for 
example that in case of an inconsistency between the covenants and treaties 
regarding the fundamental human rights to which Romania is part of, and the 
internal laws, the application of the international laws has priority. The 
constitutional dispositions regarding the rights and liberties of the citizens will be 
interpreted and applied in consistency with the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, with the covenants and other treaties to which Romania is part of (articles 
11 and 20). 
On the other side, in order to ensure the respect of human rights, special 
mechanisms have been established, meant to guarantee the application of the 
regulations on human rights. These organisms have been created through 
international acts that represent the willingly approval of the states. We remind in 
this context the Optional Protocol of the International Covenant on civil and 
political rights in which the competence of the Committee for human rights is 
recognized, established based on dispositions of articles 28-45, part IV of the 
covenant, to receive and examine notifications presented by persons that  belong to 
ACTA UNIVERSITATIS DANUBIUS                                                    No. 3/2010 
 
108 
the jurisdiction of a state, claiming to be the victims of violation by that state 
regarding the rights listed in the covenant and communicate the decisions to the 
interested party. Also, the Committee has the competence to study the reports 
presented by the states on the measures adopted in applying the dispositions of the 
Covenant, to elaborate general reports and make suggestions to the states. What is 
important to keep in mind is that the right to petition of the private persons 
provisioned in the Optional Protocol is presented as a mechanism of protection 
very relevant to the researched subject. 
In the same context, the Committee for the racial discrimination was constituted 
which has the purpose to supervise the application of the Convention adopted by 
the General Assembly of the UN, through Resolution 2106 A(XX) on December 
21st 1965, entered into force on January 4th, 1969 that provisions a similar right in 
article 14 but also the Committee against torture, created for the application of the 
Convention against torture and other punishments or cruel treatments, inhuman or 
degrading adopted by the General Assembly through Resolution 39/ 46 on 
December 10th 1984 and entered into force on June 26th 1987 (see article 22). 
We can also mention the resolutions adopted by the UN and UNESCO that confers 
persons and groups of persons the ability to address to the organs of the UN. 
Procedures for the examination of certain situations or problems have been adopted 
regarding the human rights in the areas of competence of the UNESCO. 
In order to exemplify at a regional scale, we remind one of the most well known 
documents, the European Convention on Human Rights concluded in Rome on 
November 4th 1950 and entered into force on September 3rd 1953. It represents an 
international treaty that institutes the Court and its functioning. The Convention 
contains a list of rights and guarantees that the states commit to respect. These 
rights are provisioned in the Convention itself, together with the protocols no.1, 4, 
6, 7 and 13. The subjects that have the right to address the European Court of 
Human Rights are: any private person, nongovernmental organization or a group of 
private persons that pretend to be the victims of a violation coming from a party 
state. The Court will only be able to examine the requests pointing at one of the 
states that have ratified the Convention and Protocols. It is necessary that the 
complaints refer to the acts of one public authority from one of these states, the 
complaints pointing at a private person or a private institution not having any 
validity. Also the Court will only examine the complaints that respect the rule 
according to which the prior internal means of appeal have to be exhausted. In case 
the Court observes a violation of one or more rights by a member states it issues a 
decision. The decision is mandatory the state being obliged to execute it. The 
European Convention established a system of protection for human rights that has 
proved to be the most advanced and effective of the systems elaborated so far. 
Terry Davis, former general secretary of the Council of Europe declared that: “The 




Europe whose vocation consists in protecting the rights of over 800 million 
Europeans in the 46 member states. Through the European Convention of Human 
right, we have created an efficient system of international judicial guarantees for 
the human rights and fundamental liberties, a system without equivalence in the 
entire world.” 
Very important to take into account is the fact that each of these mechanisms are 
based on the recognition of the right of the individuals to address complaints to the 
mentioned international organs as human beings and not in relation to the quality 
of citizen of a state, fact that can represent an argument in favor of the idea that the 
individual is a subject of international reports. The private person can act as seen, 
for the protection of his rights addressing to certain organizations, institutions and 
international judicial instances, independently from the agreement of the state by 
situating themselves in the position of adversary of the state.  
 
3. The Individual- Subject of International Criminal Liability  
The international liability is one of the fundamental institutions of the public 
international law. The reality of the international relations includes, besides the 
international liability of the states and the liability of the international 
organizations, the one of the private persons, the institution of the international 
criminal law being consecrated already in the literature. Vespasian V. Pella defined 
criminal international law as being “the totality of substantive and procedural rules 
that govern the way of repressing the actions committed by states or individuals 
meant to disturb the international public order and the harmony among people” 
(Pella, 1926, p. 168). 
In the attempt to make a delimitation between the international criminal law and 
the criminal international law it has been established that the first category 
designates the norms of internal law that have the role to solve the situations in 
which committing the crime involves a foreign origin (the citizenship of the 
perpetrator, the place of the crime etc) but also issues related to the recognition of 
the criminal decisions issued outside the country by the judicial instances of other 
states, to the judicial assistance in criminal matters, extradition etc, while the 
second category is part of the international judicial order, the norms being 
consecrated by states in conventional or customary manner.  
According to the principle of individual and personal criminal liability, the criminal 
international liability is an attribute of humans, of private persons but the 
individual can be criminally liable. The state, although subject of international 
liability, cannot be subject of criminal liability. Claude Lambois asserted that “it 
wouldn’t be just to prejudice all the citizens without through a punishment like the 
loss of independency, which is the death penalty for states” (Lombois, 1979, p. 99).  
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Although the elements of criminal liability can be found (in incipient state of 
course) in the work of Hugo Grotius (De jure belli ac pacis) only at the beginning 
of the 19th century, documents with international character have been adopted, 
documents that have established rules of criminal law: the Geneva Convention in 
1863 on the improvement of the faith of injured militaries in the campaign armies, 
the Hague Conventions in 1899 and 1907, that have led to the codification of the 
customary law of armed conflicts, laws and customs of war, subsequent 
developments making possible that after the Second World War we had the 
possibility to talk about “modern criminal international law” (Creţu, 2001, p. 18). 
The period after the Second World War was marked by the conviction by sentences 
of the International Tribunals in Nuremberg and Tokyo of war criminals or persons 
that have committed crimes against humanity.  
More recent are the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the 
International Tribunal for Rwanda. The first was established by the Security 
council of the UN by Resolution 827 on May 25th 1993 for the sole purpose of 
punishing those responsible for the very serious violations of humanitarian law 
committed on the territory of the former Yugoslavia between January 1st 1991 and 
a date that will be established by the Security Council after the restoration of peace. 
The Criminal International Tribunal for punishing people responsible for genocide 
and other very serious violations of international humanitarian law committed on 
the territory of Rwanda and the citizens of this state between January 1st 1994 and 
December 31st 1994 was established by Resolution no.955 on November 8th 1994 
of the Security council, in virtue of Chapter VII of the UN, after the example of the 
International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.  
The efforts that have been going on for decades for the establishment of a 
international criminal law, with permanent character and universal competency 
were successful by signing the Statute of the International Criminal Court, in Rome 
on July 7th 1998. This judicial instance is competent to judge and punish private 
persons guilty of committing serious crimes: genocide, crimes against humanity, 
war crimes and aggression as stated in article 5 of the Statute, if they are aged over 
18. The Statute of the International Criminal Court consecrates the principle of 
individual criminal liability. 
 
4. Conclusions  
After this analysis, we can formulate a few observations with conclusive character. 
The individual, having the quality of person, is an absolute human being, endowed 
with conscience and acting in accordance with his own needs and percepts. At 
interior level, humans are the master of their own actions that manifest at the 
exterior. In order to be free and independent and in order to act according to their 




independence, as much as they are wanted, are not possible if not offered within an 
order, be it moral or of law. 
If in antiquity humans defined the citizens, the interests of the state as unique 
legitimacy being the most important, together with the natural law, the idea that the 
rule of law (internal or international) cannot be addressed but to humans appeared, 
as intelligent beings with the capacity to understand it and comply with it. We can 
assert now that the judicial statute of the individual- subject of law is determined 
starting from the internal regulations but at the same time, the general protection 
frame of the fundamental rights and liberties is regulated by international 
mechanisms and instruments. A separate set of international regulations refer to the 
individual liability in international law.  
Thus, traditionally, the international law is understood as an exclusive inter state 
law, defined as an assembly of rules that govern the reports between the states, 
built based on the “theory of the two spheres” (Virally, 1969, p. 323), the evolution 
of the international society especially after the Second World War, has lead to the 
recognition, to a certain extent, of the international personality for other categories 
of subjects especially the role of the individual in international law. This idea is not 
accepted so far by all the doctrinaires and the quality of subject of international law 
of the individual is far from reaching unanimity. 
We presented in the paper some arguments able to underline international rights 
and obligations whose titular is the individual, private person. Or this means 
subject of international law. The individuals are, according to the international 
regulations, the recipients and the beneficiaries of rights consecrated in 
international documents whose importance cannot be contested. They benefit from 
this type of procedures created using special mechanisms that allow direct access to 
international institutions and organisms with the purpose of protecting them. Also, 
individuals have obligations according to the international criminal law. We 
exclude ab initio that the individual could stand on an equal position with the states 
regarding the quality of subject of international law. The norms of international law 
are the result of a willingly agreement between the states. The states are the 
creators and recipients of the norm of international law. 
But the international intergovernmental organizations do not fulfill these conditions 
either; they have the international capacity conferred by the states by their 
constitutive act. The national liberation movements represent also an exception in 
what concerns the international capacity. Why wouldn’t the individual be 
considered as a subject of international law, with limited international capacity? 
The evolution of the international law starting with the period after the Second 
World War registered a change regarding the statute of the individual as titular of 
rights and obligations conferred by the international law. We assert that the 
arguments brought by us in favor of these ideas have the ability to tip the balance 
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towards what Andrew Clapham named in a recent article, a step that could help “to 
build an international community which properly recognizes the role of the 
individual in international law”. (Clapham, 2010, p. 30). 
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